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Abstract
This paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in
an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity,
and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an
infrastructure input. Absent stochastic shocks, decentralized tax setting (two or
more jurisdictions) maximizes the rate of growth, as the constant returns to scale
present with endogenous growth implies “extreme” tax competition. Stochastic
shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem, which may dampen
down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level. Growth
can be lower with decentralization. Our results also predict a negative relationship
between output volatility and growth, consistent with the empirical evidence.
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1. Introduction
The link between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is increasingly attracting
the attention of economists. In particular, a growing body of empirical research is in-
vestigating the links between measures of fiscal decentralization and growth, both at the
country and sub-national level. Overall, the evidence is mixed. In particular, cross-
country studies, which generally use similar measures of fiscal decentralization, can find
positive or negative eﬀects, depending on precise measure of decentralization, sample, es-
timation method, etc. (Davoodi and Zhu (1998), Wooler and Phillips (1998), Zhang and
Zou (1998), Iimi (2005), Thornton (2007)). More recently, two studies on US data have
found more robust evidence that fiscal decentralization increases growth (Akai and Sakata
(2002), Stansel (2005)). For example, Stansel (2005), in a study of growth over 30 years in
314 US metropolitan areas, has found that the degree of fractionalization (the number of
county governments per million population in a metropolitan area) significantly increases
growth.
On the theoretical side, explanation of the mechanisms linking fiscal decentralization
and growth are thin on the ground. Two mechanisms have been studied. First, as shown
by Lejour and Verbon (1997), and Hatfield (2006), tax competition can lower the tax on
capital, thus increasing the return to savings, and thus growth, in an endogenous growth
model. Second, Brueckner (2006) shows that centralization, if it imposes uniform public
good provision across regions, can lower the rate of savings and thus growth, although
this mechanism appears to require diﬀerence in the mix of young and old across fiscal
jurisdictions.
This paper makes a contribution to understanding of the tax competition mechanism.
In formalizing this mechanism, there is a basic dilemma1. To understand the eﬀect of fiscal
policy on growth, a simple endogenous growth model is required. But, simple endogenous
growth models have constant returns to scale. As a consequence, in (for example) an
AK-type growth model, the firm’s demand for capital is perfectly elastic at the tax-
inclusive price of capital. This in turn, under the standard assumption of perfect mobility
of capital across regions (i.e. that households can move their capital costlessly across
regions) implies “extreme” or Bertrand tax competition: each jurisdiction can undercut
the others by a fraction and capture all the capital in the economy. The result is that
under decentralization, the tax is driven down to zero, and the growth rate is maximized.
More recently, Hatfield (2006) has shown that a similar conclusion holds very generally2
1See Lejour and Verbon (1997), who implicitly make this point.
2This holds even when labour supply is endogenous and is taxable, when there are consumption and
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in Barro’s (1990) model of infrastructure growth: that is, there is a tax-inclusive price
of capital at which firms are willing to employ any level of the capital input. So, the
allocation of capital is determined by households, who move capital to the region with
the highest price. Thus, again there is implies extreme or Bertrand tax competition:
jurisdictions compete to set taxes to achieve the highest pre-tax price of capital. As there
is an infrastructure public good funded by the capital tax, this price-maximising tax is
not zero, but strictly positive. Nevertheless, the conclusion is the same as in the AK
model: under decentralization, the rate of return on savings, and thus the growth rate is
maximized.
So, if capital mobility is assumed perfect (costless) between jurisdictions, we have a
rather limited theory of the link between tax competition and growth, which cannot easily
accommodate the findings of some empirical studies that this relationship is negative. In
this paper, we suggest a way out of this dilemma, which does not rely on any ad hoc
assumptions about imperfect mobility of capital.
We start with a standard AK model with a consumption public good financed out
of a tax on capital. We assume only that there are independent stochastic shocks to
production in each of n regions. This generates stochastic returns to capital invested by
a household in each region. Thus, a standard portfolio argument implies that - if taxes
are not too diﬀerent - the household located in one region will want to invest some of its
accumulated capital in all regions. This in turn generates a negative fiscal externality: an
increase in the tax in any “foreign” region reduces the return to savings in the “home”
region, and also thus the capital employed in the “home” region.
The key point is that this negative externality oﬀsets the positive externality arising
from mobile capital (i.e. that an increase in the foreign region’s tax leads to a capital
outflow from the foreign region to the home region). This implies that when the second
externality dominates, taxation under decentralization will be higher, and growth lower,
than with centralization. Analytical results show that this occurs when (i) the number of
regions is small; (ii) when the variance of the shock is suﬃciently high.
We then modify the AK model to the Barro (1990) model of infrastructure growth
in which we allow the production technology to be stochastic. This has the consequence
that the pre-tax rate of return to capital becomes stochastic, an eﬀect which magnifies as
the amount of infrastructure goods increases. Since each region also hosts capital from
non-residents, this specification introduces a third type of externality of decentralized
infrastructure goods, and where agents are diﬀerent within regions (with respect to their endowments of
capital) and decisions are made by majority voting.
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government policy. A higher tax increases the riskiness of investment and thus the risk-
bearing of non-residents. We find that when the variance is zero, centralization yields
a tax rate which is too high to be growth maximizing, while decentralization yields a
tax rate which is growth maximizing (replicating the result in Hatfield, 2006). By a
continuity argument, growth is higher under decentralized government when the variance
of the shock is small. But, as the variance of the shock increases, centralization may
generate higher growth than decentralization, as in the consumption public good case.
One of the interesting predictions of our model concerns the relationship between the
variance of stochastic shocks and growth. With a public consumption good, we show
analytically that growth is (at least weakly) decreasing in the variance of the output
shock. With a public infrastructure good, and fiscal decentralization, simulation results
indicate a negative relationship between growth and the variance of output shock. This is
consistent with the macroeconomic evidence (see Ramey and Ramey, 1995), although of
course there are other mechanisms linking output shocks and growth (Jones and Manuelli,
2005).
The most closely related paper3 to ours is Lejour and Verbon (1997). They were
the first to point out that if the household has a diversified (across tax jurisdictions)
portfolio of investments across regions, a negative externality via savings could arise in
equilibrium. But, the modelled this in an ad hoc way. They just assume that there is
some convex mobility cost of moving capital between regions. The increasing marginal
cost ensures that capital moves smoothly between regions in response to price (and thus
tax) diﬀerential. Moreover, to generate higher taxes under decentralization, Lejour and
Verbon (1997) have to introduce another ad hoc element into the mobility cost function:
that is, it is assumed that when returns to capital in two regions are the same, households
have a strict preference for investing some of their capital in the foreign region i.e. a
preference for diversity4.
The paper is also related to an existing literature on public finance in models of sto-
chastic growth, where fiscal policy rules are taken to be fixed (Turnovsky, 2000 and Kenc,
3Another related paper is by Lee (2004), who studies the impact of output shocks on tax competition
in a static model. However, in his model, as the number of regions is assumed large, investors can be
sure of a certain return on capital ,and only face uncertain wage income. Thus, the negative externality
arising though portfolio choice which is studied here does not arise in his model.
4Formally, if s is the share of capital invested outside the home region, the mobility cost is c(s) =
−vs+μs2/2. Given this specification, it is possible to establish that for v large enough relative to μ, the
equilibrium tax on capital can be higher under decentralization, and thus growth lower. Unfortunately,
the v and μ parameters are almost impossible to interpret empirically.
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2004). By contrast, in this paper, taxes are optimized by governments. So, this paper is
the only one, to our knowledge, that studies endogenous tax policy in a stochastic growth
model. For endogenous tax policy in a deterministic growth models, see Philippopoulos
(2003) and Philippopoulos and Park (2003). But these two papers do not deal with the
issue of capital mobility and its impact on tax policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, solves for
equilibrium conditional on fixed government policy, and identifies the fiscal externalities
at work in the model. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 modifies the model
to include infrastructure public goods. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Set-Up
2.1. The Model
Our model is a dynamic stochastic version of the Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model,
where regional government use source-based capital taxes to finance the provision of a
public good. The economy evolves in continuous time: t ∈ [0,∞). There are n regions,
i = 1, ..n. There is one firm in each region, which produces output from capital according
to the constant returns production function. Expressed in diﬀerential form, changes in
output in region i over the interval (t, dt) is :
dyi = ki(dt+ dzi)
where ki is the capital stocks at t, and the stochastic variable5 dzi is temporally indepen-
dent with variance σ2idt over the period (t, dt).
Firms in region i are willing to operate at any scale iﬀ, over any interval (t, dt), the
change in output per unit of capital dt + dzi, is equal to the cost of capital, ridt + τ idt,
where ri is the rental price of capital at t, and τ i is the tax on the use of capital. Thus,
the rental price of capital in region i is determined by:
ridt = dt+ dzi − τ idt = (1− τ i)dt+ dzi (2.1)
The actual allocation of capital across regions will then be determined by households, as
described below.
5The assumption that random shocks take the form of Brownian motion is standard in stochastic
growth models. It describes a situation where productivity is subject to frequent small changes; see
Turnovsky (2000) for more discussion.
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Each region is populated by a number of identical infinitely-lived households, and the
population in each region is normalized to 1. In region gi, each household has a flow of
utility from private consumption and a public good:
u(ci, gi) = ln ci + β ln gi,
where each of the two utility functions has the same fixed degree of relative risk-aversion
equal to unity. At each t, the household in region i has an endowment of the private good
(wealth) wi, which it can rent to any firm. Let sij be the share of wi rented to the foreign
firm. The household chooses ci, sij to maximize the expected present value of utility - this
problem is considered in Section 2.2 below.
Finally, in region i, the public good is wholly financed by a source-based tax on capital
i.e. gi = τ iki. This is without loss of generality, as there is no wage income in the model,
so our analysis would go through if τ i were re-specified as an output tax.
We can now see more formally why in the absence of uncertainty (σi ≡ 0), taxes and
public good provision would be zero under decentralization. Without uncertainty, the
households in any region will simply allocate its capital to the region where the return
on savings is highest. Given the negative relationship between r and τ in (2.1), it is then
clear that all capital will flow into region(s) where τ i is lowest. This in turn implies that
without mobility costs, there will be a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes, with the
only possible equilibrium tax being zero6.
2.2. Solving The Household Problem
Households solve a portfolio allocation/savings problem under uncertainty. First, wealth
evolves according to
dwi =
nX
j=1
sijrjwidt− cidt (2.2)
where
P
j sijrjdt is the overall return on wealth over the interval (t, dt). Combining (2.2)
and (2.1), we get:
dwi = [μiwi − ci]dt+ wi
nX
j=1
sijdzj (2.3)
6We cannot aviod this conclusion by assuming decreasing returns i.e. y = f(k), with f 00(k) < 0, as
then we are back to a Solow-type growth model, where taxes do not aﬀect growth (in the long run).
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where μi =
P
j sij(1 − τ j) is the deterministic part (average) rate of return on wealth.
Thus, household in region i chooses ci, sij to maximize
E
∙Z ∞
0
e−ρt ln cidt
¸
(2.4)
subject to (2.3) and
Pn
j=1 sij = 1. Finally, we assume that the taxes (and thus the mean
return to investing in any given region) are time-invariant (this assumption will be verified
below). The solution to this problem is well-known (e.g. Jones and Manuelli, 2005) and
easily stated. First, the optimal consumption rule is simply
ci = ρwi (2.5)
Second, the portfolio shares sij , j 6= i are determined by the n−1 first-order conditions
τ i − τ j −
"ÃX
j 6=i
sij − 1
!
σ2i + sijσ
2
j
#
= 0, j 6= i. (2.6)
To get intuition, consider the two-region case. Then, (2.6) solve for regions 1, 2 to give
s12 =
τ 1 − τ 2 + σ21
σ21 + σ22
, s21 =
τ 2 − τ 1 + σ22
σ22 + σ21
. (2.7)
The portfolio rule is simple and intuitive; invest more “abroad” i.e. outside the home
region i; (i) the higher the diﬀerence in average returns as measured by τ i − τ j; (ii) the
lower the relative uncertainty of investing abroad i.e. σ2j/σ2i .
2.3. Fiscal Externalities
In this section, we identify the fiscal externalities at work in the model. We focus on the
two-region case, thinking of region 1 as the home region. We trace the eﬀects of a change
in τ 2 on home welfare. To simplify further, assume that σ2 = σ1 = σ. Then the portfolio
allocation rule for home and foreign households is
s12 =
1
2
+
τ 1 − τ 2
2σ2
, s21 =
1
2
+
τ 2 − τ 1
2σ2
. (2.8)
Moreover the capital employed in the home region is
k1 = (1− s12)w + s21w2. (2.9)
Finally, in the home region, the household’s optimal accumulation of capital follows the
rule (2.3), given also (2.5);
dw1 = w1 (μ1 − ρ) dt+ (1− s12)dz + s12dz∗.
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By inspection of (2.8),(2.9), (2.3), we can identify two fiscal externalities in the model.
First, τ 2 up implies s21 up and s12 down from optimal portfolio choice, implying k1 up.
This is the well-known positive capital mobility externality: an increase in the foreign tax
causes a capital outflow, benefitting the home region. Note that it is measured (inversely)
by σ; the higher σ, the weaker is this externality, as the higher σ, the stronger the
incentive for the household to maintain a balanced portfolio.
Second, τ 2 up has two related eﬀects. First, it directly aﬀects home welfare by lowering
μ1 = (1 − s12)τ 1 − s12τ 2, the deterministic part of the return on w1. Second, it lowers
μ2, and thus w2 and thus k1. We call this the negative rate of return externality. Note
that the size of this externality is measured by s12, s21 : specifically, this externality only
operates in equilibrium if s12, s21 > 0. But, the portfolio allocation rule ensures that at
symmetric equilibrium, s12 = s21 = 0.5.
3. Equilibrium Taxes
In this section, we further simplify by assuming σi = σ, i = 1, ..n. Our approach here
is the following. It is diﬃcult to solve for government i0s problem given arbitrary taxes
τ j, j 6= i. So, we assume that all regions j 6= i set the same (time-invariant) tax τ ∗, and
solve for region i0s best response to τ ∗.We show that this is also time-invariant i.e. some
τ . Then, imposing τ = τ ∗ gives a condition for the Nash equilibrium tax.
We proceed as follows. First, let sij = s, j 6= i, be the share of wealth invested by the
households in region i in any region j 6= i. Note that from (2.6), and τ j = τ ∗, j 6= i, these
share must all be the same. Indeed, evaluating (2.6) at σi = σ, sij = s, and τ i = τ , τ j = τ ∗,
and solving, we get
s =
τ − τ ∗
nσ2
+
1
n
(3.1)
Next, let s∗ = sji, j 6= i, sˆ = sjk, k 6= j 6= i be the shares of wealth invested by the
households in region j 6= i in region i and the n− 2 regions k 6= j 6= i respectively. Again
from (2.6), s∗, sˆ solve the two simultaneous equations
τ ∗ − τ − σ2[−1 + 2s∗ + (n− 2)sˆ] = 0 (3.2)
−σ2[−1 + (n− 1)sˆ+ s∗] = 0. (3.3)
We are only interested in s∗. Solving (3.2), (3.3), we get
s∗ =
(n− 1) (τ ∗ − τ)
nσ2
+
1
n
. (3.4)
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Now let w be the wealth of region i, and w∗ be the average wealth of regions j 6= i.
Then, by definition,
k = (1− (n− 1)s)w + (n− 1)s∗w∗. (3.5)
Then, using the government budget constraint g = τk, and the consumption rule c =
ρw, the government of i’s instantaneous payoﬀ can be written
ln c+ β ln g = κ+ lnw + β ln k + β ln τ . (3.6)
So, it is clear from (3.6) and (3.5) that there are two state variables in the problem, w
and w∗. These follow the following processes. First, from (2.3), given also (2.5), σi = σ,
and the definition of s;
dw = w (1− (1− (n− 1)s)τ − (n− 1)sτ ∗ − ρ) dt+(1− (n−1)s)dzi+(n−1)sdz∗, (3.7)
where dz∗ = 1n−1
P
j 6=i dzj. Second, the process for some wj is
dwj = w (1− (1− s∗)τ ∗ − s∗τ − ρ) dt+ s∗dzi + (1− s∗ − (n− 2)sˆ)dzj + sˆ
X
k 6=j 6=i
dzk.
So, as w∗ = 1n−1
P
j 6=iwj, tedious but straightforward calculation gives
dw∗ = w∗ (1− (1− s∗)τ ∗ − s∗τ − ρ) dt+ s∗dzi + (1− s∗)dz∗. (3.8)
So, the problem for the government of region i is to choose τ to maximize
E
∙Z ∞
0
(lnw + β ln ((1− (n− 1)s)w + (n− 1)s∗w∗) + β ln τ) e−ρtdt
¸
subject to (3.7),(3.8), and the portfolio allocation rules (3.1) and (3.4).
Our approach to this problem follows Turnovsky (2000). We first write down the
Bellman equation defining V (w,w∗), and thus characterizing the optimal choice of τ ,
given τ ∗.We then evaluate this Bellman equation at τ = τ ∗. To get a closed-form solution
for the equilibrium τ , we must guess the correct form of the value function V (w,w∗),
which we are able to do, using the fact, from (3.7),(3.8), that symmetric equilibrium
(s = s∗ = 1n), w = w
∗. Specifically, we guess that V (w,w) ≡ A + ψ lnw. All these steps
are dealt with in detail in the Appendix, and the end result is:
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Proposition 1. The equilibrium tax rate with n regions is
τn =
ρβ
ρβ(n−1)
σ2 +
1+β
n
. (3.9)
The tax rate is increasing in the preference for the public good, β, the rate of discount,
ρ, and the size of the output shock, σ.
A number of comments are in order here. This formula and the comparative statics are
intuitive. First, the higher the marginal valuation of the public good, the higher the tax.
Second, the less the household values future growth i.e. the higher ρ, the more it is willing
to increase the tax rate to fund the public good now, at the expense of future growth in the
tax base. Third, the higher σ, the weaker the response of the capital stock in any region
to a change in the tax rate in that region (when n > 1), and so the smaller the mobile tax
base externality, thus increasing the equilibrium tax. Intuitively, the smaller the variance,
the more willing are investors to move their wealth between regions in response to tax
diﬀerences, thus increasing the mobility of the tax base.
More formally note from (3.5), in symmetric equilibrium,
∂k
∂τ
= −(n− 1)w∂s
∂τ
+ (n− 1)w∗∂s
∗
∂τ
= −(n− 1)w 1
nσ2
− (n− 1)2w∗ 1
nσ2
= −k(n− 1) 1
σ2
, (3.10)
where in the last line we used w = w∗ = k. So, the semi-elasticity 1k
∂k
∂τ = (n − 1)/σ2 is
clearly decreasing in σ. Note also that the more regions, the bigger this elasticity. This is a
similar result to those for the standard static model of tax competition. Note finally this
eﬀect is operative only when n > 1; with full centralization (n = 1), the size of stochastic
shocks make no diﬀerence to τ .
Last, we turn to comparative statics in n. This is a key question because nmeasures the
degree of fiscal decentralization. Inspection of (3.9) shows that n aﬀects the denominator
of τ in two places, corresponding to the two diﬀerent externalities identified above. First,
a higher n increases the tax base elasticity, as already remarked; this is measured by the
term ρβ(n−1)σ2 which is simply ρβ times the semi-elasticity of the tax base with respect to
τ .
Second, an increase in n increases the rate of return externality, corresponding to the
term 1n(1 + β). Intuitively, any resident of region i only invests
1
n of his wealth at home
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in equilibrium. So, the government of region i ignores the negative eﬀect of the tax in
region i on the rate of return to investors in all the other regions, measured by n−1n (1+β).
As the externalities have opposite eﬀects on τ , we expect that the eﬀect of n on τ is
not monotonic, and this is confirmed by the following result:
Proposition 2. There is a critical value of n, nˆ =
q
(1+β)σ2
ρβ , such that τn is increasing
in n for n < nˆ, and decreasing in n for n > nˆ. Finally, τn −→ 0 as n −→ ∞, so that
if there are suﬃciently many regions, the decentralized tax is lower than the centralized
tax.
Proof. The denominator of (3.9), ρβ(n−1)σ2 +
1+β
n , is a convex function of n, with a
minimum at n =
q
(1+β)σ2
ρβ = nˆ. Thus, τn must be a quasi-concave function of n, with a
maximum at the same value. Finally, by inspection, τn −→ 0 as n −→∞. ¤
The most interesting result here is that the eﬀect of n on τn is generally ambiguous.
This is of course, because an increase in n increases both the mobile tax base and rate of
return externalities, which have opposite signs. So, Proposition 2 says that for n small,
the rate of return externality dominates, whereas for n large, the mobile tax externality
dominates. Figure 3.1 illustrates the capital tax rate as a function of the number of regions
(assuming β = 1 and ρ = 0.1). For instance, for σ2 = 0.5 the tax rate is maximal at n ≈
2. The rate of return externality dominates the mobile tax externality for n ∈ {2, 3, 4} .
The final step in our analysis is to relate taxes and growth. First, at any instant,
output must be divided between private and public consumption, i.. y = c + g. Next,
from the government budget constraint and (2.5), we have in symmetric equilibrium that
y = ρw + τk = (ρ+ τ)w. So, the growth of output is just proportional to that of wealth.
Finally, from (3.8) and the definition of dz∗, in symmetric equilibrium:
dw = (1− τ − ρ)w + 1
n
X
i
dzi.
Growth has a stochastic and deterministic component, and only the latter is aﬀected by
taxes, being decreasing in the tax. In what follows, we refer to 1− τ − ρ as the average
growth rate.
So, Figure 3.1 indicates that full centralization (n = 1) yields higher growth than
moderate decentralization (n < 5). It is only when n = 5 that the mobile tax base
externality dominates and thus growth under decentralization is higher.
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Figure 3.1: τ as a function of n for β = 1 and ρ = 0.1.
4. Infrastructure Public Goods
4.1. The Model
We now modify the baseline set-up by allowing the government to spend on a public in-
frastructure good rather than consumption good. For tractability, we assume two regions,
unstarred (home) and starred (foreign). We will focus on home region. Output follows
the process
dy = g1−αkα(dt+ dz).
Following Turnovsky (2000) and Kenc (2004), we assume that the pretax wage, a, over
the period (t, t + dt) is determined at the start of the period and is equal to expected
marginal product
adt = (1− α)g1−αkαdt
= (1− α)τ 1−αkdt = θ(τ)kdt (4.1)
using the budget constraint g = τk. So, the wage is non-random. The rate of return
(pre-tax) over the period (t, t+ dt) is thus determined residually:
dy − adt
k
= αg1−αkα−1dt+ g1−αkα−1dz
= ατ 1−αdt+ τ 1−αdz (4.2)
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using the budget constraint g = τk. So, the post-tax rate of return thus follows the process
dR = (ατ 1−α − τ)dt+ τ 1−αdz = r(τ)dt+ τ 1−αdz. (4.3)
where r(τ) = ατ 1−α − τ plays an important role below.
4.2. Solving the Household Problem
For simplicity, consumer preferences are logarithmic. The consumer maximizes
E
∙Z ∞
0
e−ρt ln cdt
¸
(4.4)
subject to the stochastic wealth equation
dw = (1− s)wdR+ swdR∗ + adt− cdt (4.5)
= [(1− s)r(τ) + sr(τ ∗)]wdt+ θ(τ)kdt− cdt+ (1− s)wτ 1−αdz + sw(τ ∗)1−αdz∗.
Unlike consumption good case, this problem is non-standard, and so for completeness, we
provide a solution in the Appendix. Moreover, in deriving the solution, we suppose that
the household believes7 that k ≡ w, a belief which is true in equilibrium. The consumption
and portfolio allocation rule for the home region are
c = ρw and s =
(r∗ − r)/σ2 + τ 2(1−α)
(τ 2(1−α) + (τ ∗)2(1−α))
. (4.6)
We can now compare (4.6) to (2.8). The diﬀerence is only in the portfolio allocation rules;
for comparison, the consumption good rule can be written s = 1
2
+ r
∗−r
2σ2 in the notation
of this Section. The diﬀerence is that in (4.6), τ , τ ∗ aﬀect the rule directly, and not just
via their eﬀects on r. This is because a higher tax rate in the home region increases
the pre-tax rate of return on capital in the home region and thereby the riskiness of the
investment from (4.3).
4.3. Fiscal Externalities
Besides the tax base externality and the rate-of-return externality identified in the AK-
model, the infrastructure model exhibits a third type of externality. Following (4.2)
7This assumption is slightly diﬀerent than rational expectations, as when τ 6= τ∗, k 6= w in general.
However, we cannot solve the household problem in closed form under fully rational expectations when
τ 6= τ∗.
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the pre-tax rate of return is stochastic and a higher tax rate magnifies the exposure of
investors to risk. Since each region also hosts capital from non-residents, this specification
introduces a negative externality, i.e. a higher tax increases the riskiness of investment
and thus the risk-bearing of non-residents. We call this externality the risk-exposure
externality. We will now characterize the equilibrium tax policy under (de)centralization
and relate it to the externalities.
4.4. Centralization
Under centralization, using (4.6), the government maximizes
E
∙Z ∞
0
e−ρt ln cdt
¸
= E
∙Z ∞
0
e−ρt lnwdt
¸
+ const
subject to τ = τ ∗. It also understands that
k = w, s = s∗ = 0.5.
So, there is a single state variable w:
dw = [r(τ)− ρ]wdt+ θ(τ)kdt+ wτ1−α[0.5dz + 0.5dz∗].
The Bellman equation is
ρV (w,w∗) = max
τ
n
lnw + [r(τ) + θ(τ)− ρ]Vww + Vwww
2
2
σ2w
o
,
where σ2w = 0.5τ 2(1−α)σ2. The FOC is
Vww[r0 + θ0] +
Vwww2σ
2(1−α)τ1−2α
2
= 0.
Now, we guess V (w,w) = A+B lnw. Then, the FOC becomes, cancelling B,
r0 + θ0 − σ
2(1− α)τ 1−2α
4
= 0. (4.7)
To interpret this condition, it is helpful to note that (following exactly the argument
in the consumption case), the average growth rate in output is r(τ) − ρ, where r(τ) =
ατ 1−α−τ is a strictly concave function with a unique maximum at τˆ = (α(1−α))1/α > 0.
Although (4.7) cannot be solved explicitly for the tax rate, we can see that in the
absence of uncertainty, r0 + θ0 = 0. As θ0 = (1 − α)2τ−α > 0 i.e. the tax has a positive
eﬀect on the wage, r0 < 0. Thus, the tax rate is too high to be growth-maximising.
This reproduces the finding of Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Note that uncertainty implies
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r0 + θ0 > 0, i.e. it tends to lower τ .8 This is because an increase in τ raises the pre-tax
return on capital (4.2), and thus the riskiness of investments. So, in principle, τC could
maximize growth when there are stochastic shocks to production.
4.5. Decentralization
Using using (4.6), the government in the home region maximizes
E
∙Z ∞
0
e−ρt ln cdt
¸
=
∙Z ∞
0
e−ρt lnwdt
¸
+ const.
It also understands that
k = (1− s)w + s∗w∗, k∗ = (1− s∗)w∗ + sw (4.8)
and
s =
(r∗(τ ∗)− r(τ))/σ2 + τ 2(1−α)
(τ 2(1−α) + (τ ∗)2(1−α))
, s∗ =
(r(τ)− r∗(τ ∗))/σ2 + (τ ∗)2(1−α)
(τ 2(1−α) + (τ ∗)2(1−α))
. (4.9)
As in the AK model, there are two state variables, w and w∗. Their equations are:
dw = [(1− s)r(τ) + sr(τ ∗)− ρ]wdt+ θ(τ)kdt+ (1− s)wτ 1−αdz + sw(τ ∗)1−αdz∗
dw∗ = [(1− s∗)r(τ ∗) + s∗r(τ)− ρ]w∗dt+ θ(τ ∗)k∗dt+ (1− s∗)w∗(τ ∗)1−αdz∗ + s∗w∗τ 1−αdz.
Again, we set up the Bellman equation and guess the functional form of the value func-
tion in order to derive the FOC. All these steps are dealt with in detail in the Appendix,
and the resulting FOC, evaluated at symmetric equilibrium, is:
0.5r0 + θ0 + θ
kτ
k
− σ
2(1− α)τ 1−2α
4
= 0. (4.10)
Comparing to the centralized case,
r0 + θ0 − σ
2(1− α)τ 1−2α
2
= 0,
one observes three diﬀerences.
• First, due to the mobile tax base externality, we have the term θ kτk in the FOC. kτk
measures the percentage capital outflow due to a 1 percentage point increase in the
tax.
8In fact, invoking the implicit function theorem we unambiguously find dτ/dσ < 0 if the share of
output accruing to capital α ≤ 0.5.
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• Second, due to the rate of return externality, r0 enters with a weight of only 0.5.
The rationale is that half of the total return to capital goes to foreigners and the
eﬀect of tax policy on it is external to the government.
• Third, the impact of capital taxation on risk exposure of foreigners is not recognized
(risk exposure externality), explaining the weight 0.5 in the last term.
Thus, in general the average growth rate of the economy, which is r(τ)− ρ, may be
higher or lower under decentralization relative to centralization. To begin the comparison,
we can obtain an analytical result confirming (Hatfield, 2006) when there is no uncertainty.
Clearly, (4.7) reduces to r0 = −θ0 when σ = 0, whereas (4.10) reduces to r0 = 0.9 Thus,
in the absence of productivity shocks the government sets the tax rate so as to maximize
the average growth rate r (τ) − ρ with decentralization, but with centralization, the tax
is too high to be growth-maximising:
Proposition 3. If σ = 0, τD = τˆ < τC , so or all n, so the average growth rate is always
higher under decentralization.
What happens with stochastic shocks? Although we cannot solve explicitly for the
equilibrium tax rates τC and τD, appealing to Proposition 3 and a continuity argument
we know that we know that τC > τD also holds for a small enough variance of the
production shock. This allows us to conclude that decentralization yields higher growth
when the variance is small.
The latter finding does however not extend to any size of the variance. First, consider
how taxes change as σ increases - see figure 4.1. It might be surprising that the decen-
tralized tax rate decreases with the variance of the shock. At first sight, it appears that
a higher variance should increase the benefit of portfolio diversification, thereby making
the investment decision less sensitive to the tax rate diﬀerential (recall Proposition 1).
As a first observation, a higher variance increases the pre-tax return on capital (4.2). In
response the government lowers the tax rate - last term in (4.10). A second eﬀect operates
through the mobility of capital. Noting (4.8) and (4.9)
kτ = −sτw + s∗τw∗ and sτ = −s∗τ = −
r0
2σ2τ 2(1−α)
+
(1− α)
2τ
.
Thus, in symmetric equilibrium
kτ
k
=
r0
σ2τ 2(1−α)
− (1− α)
τ
. (4.11)
9More firmly, following (4.1), (4.8) and (4.9) θ kτw reduces to −θ
0 when σ → 0.
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Figure 4.1: τC (thin line) and τD (solid line) as a function of σ for α = 0.5.
Under decentralization and σ > 0, we know that r0 > 0 for α = 0.5. So, when σ
rises, assuming kτ < 0, from (4.11), the semi-elasticity of capital with respect to the tax
increases in absolute value. This in turn tends to decrease the equilibrium tax from (4.10).
This is in contrast to the case with a public consumption good where a higher variance
makes the tax base less elastic - see (3.10).
Note finally that as kτ is independent of ρ from (4.11), and (4.7),(4.10) are otherwise
independent of ρ, then τD, τC are also independent of ρ. This is in contrast to the con-
sumption public good case. This is because taxation and infrastructure provision have
countervailing eﬀects on growth which are equated at the margin.
Now we turn to the relationship between decentralization and growth, recalling that
the average growth rate is r(τ) − ρ. Figure 4.2 shows how rC = r(τC) and rD = r(τD)
vary as σ increases.
In the absence of uncertainty a decentralized government engages in Bertrand tax
competition with the consequence of maximizing growth. The tax rate decreases as σ
increases and, since the growth rate is hump-shaped in the tax rate, growth is decreasing
in σ. A centralized government sets a too high tax rate to be growth maximizing in the
absence of uncertainty and lowers it as σ rises. For suﬃciently small values of σ growth
is rising. In fact, for σ ≈ 1.7 the growth rate equals that under decentralization and for
σ ≈ 2 the centralized tax rate is growth maximizing. For larger values both a decentralized
and centralized government operate on the upward sloping part of the growth-curve with
centralization yielding higher growth. This is in contrast to the results of Hatfield (2006),
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Figure 4.2: rC (thin line) and rD (solid line) as a function of σ for α = 0.5.
who assumes a deterministic growth model.
5. Conclusions
This paper has considered the relationship between tax competition and growth in an
endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity, and capital
taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input.
Absent stochastic shocks, decentralized tax setting (two or more jurisdictions) maximizes
the rate of growth, as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies
Bertrand tax competition. Stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice
problem. Shocks dampen down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized
level when the government provides a public consumption good. Growth can be lower
with decentralization. In the public infrastructure model shocks may increase the tax
base elasticity and the equilibrium decentralized tax rate may be too low to yield higher
growth with decentralization. Our results also predict a negative relationship between
output volatility and growth, consistent with the empirical evidence.
One might ask robust our results are. Two of our important simplifying assumptions
are logarithmic utility of private consumption, and in the case of the infrastructure model,
no taxes on labour. If logarithmic utility of private consumption is relaxed to iso-elastic
utility, we can still solve the household savings and portfolio choice problem in closed
form, but we cannot get a closed-form solution for the equilibrium tax, even in the case
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of a consumption public good. But the key externalities at work remain the same, and
as a result, it is possible to get higher taxes and lower growth with decentralization in
the public consumption good case10. In the infrastructure model, we conjecture that our
main conclusions would be unaﬀected, as long as the demand for the public good is high
enough so that it is optimal to use a capital tax at the margin.
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A. Proofs of Propositions and Other Results
Derivation of the Solution to the Household Problem in the Public Infrastruc-
ture Good Case
Using k = w in (4.5), the problem is to maximize (4.4) subject to
dw = [(1− s)r(τ) + sr(τ ∗)]wdt+ θwdt− cdt+ (1− s)wτ 1−αdz + sw (τ ∗)1−α dz∗. (A.1)
Assume the value function for this problem takes the form V (w) = A + B lnw. In this
case the Bellman equation is
ρ (A+B lnw) = max
c,s
½
ln c+ (w[(1− s)r + sr∗ + θ]− c) B
w
− B
2
σ2w
¾
where
σ2w = [(1− s)2τ 2(1−α) + s2(τ ∗)2(1−α)]σ2.
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is the variance of wealth. The first-order conditions for c and s are
1
c
− B
w
= 0 (A.2)
B
¡
r∗ − r − σ2[s(τ 2(1−α) + (τ ∗)2(1−α))− τ 2(1−α)]
¢
= 0 (A.3)
and the Bellman equation becomes
ρ (A+B lnw) = max
c,s
½
lnw − lnB + [(1− s)r + sr∗ + θ]B − 1− B
2
σ2w
¾
.
So, B = 1/ρ; using this in (A.2), (A.3) gives (4.6). ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. First rewrite the stochastic terms in the state equations as
dw˜ = (1− (n− 1)s)dzi + (n− 1)sdz∗ (A.4)
dw˜∗ = s∗dzi + (1− s∗)dz∗ (A.5)
Noting that
E[(dzi)2] = σ2dt, E[(dz∗)2] =
σ2
n− 1dt, E[dzidz
∗] = 0
one can compute from (A.4),(A.5) that
E[(dw˜)2] = [(1− (n− 1)s)2 + (n− 1)s2]σ2dt = σ2wdt
E[(dw˜∗)2] = [(1− s∗)2/(n− 1) + (s∗)2]σ2dt = σ2w∗dt
E[dw˜.dw˜∗] = [(1− (n− 1)s)s∗ + (1− s∗)s]σ2dt = ξdt
So, assuming a value function V (w,w∗), and the Bellman Equation for the government
problem can be written
ρV (w,w∗) = max
{τ}
{lnw + β ln k + β ln τ + Vww [1− (1− (n− 1)s)τ − (n− 1)sτ ∗ − ρ] (A.6)
+Vw∗w∗ [1− (1− s∗)τ ∗ − s∗τ − ρ] +
Vwww2
2
σ2w +
Vw∗w∗(w∗)2
2
σ2w∗ + Vww∗ww
∗ξ}
where k = ((1− (n− 1)s)w + (n− 1)s∗w∗) , and also taking into account the eﬀect of τ
on s, s∗, and thus on σ2w, σ2w∗, ξ . Specifically,
sτ =
1
nσ2
, s∗τ = −
n− 1
nσ2
(A.7)
dσ2w
dτ
=
2(n− 1)
n
[sn− 1], dσ
2
w∗
dτ
=
2
n
[1− ns∗] (A.8)
dξ
dτ
= [(1− ns∗)− (n− 1)(1− ns)] 1
n
(A.9)
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So, using (A.7), the FOC for the tax is
β
τ
+
β
k
∂k
∂τ
− Vww(1− (n− 1)s)− Vw∗w∗s∗ + (A.10)
(Vww + Vw∗w∗)(n− 1)(τ − τ ∗)
1
nσ2
+
1
2
Vwww2
dσ2w
dτ
+
Vw∗w∗(w∗)2
2
dσ2w∗
dτ
+ Vww∗ww
dξ
dτ
= 0
where
∂k
∂τ
= −(n− 1)wsτ + (n− 1)w∗s∗τ (A.11)
= −(n− 1)w 1
nσ2
+ (n− 1)2w∗ 1
nσ2
At symmetric equilibrium, where τ ∗ = τ and so w∗ = w = k, s = s∗ = 1n , using (A.11),
and also noting from (A.8),(A.9) that as s = s∗ = 1n ,
dσ2w
dτ =
dσ2w∗
dτ =
dξ
dτ = 0, we can rewrite
(A.10) as:
β
τ
− β(n− 1)
σ2
− 1
n
(Vww + Vw∗w∗) = 0 (A.12)
Next, note that in symmetric equilibrium, w = w∗, and assume V (w,w) ≡ A+ψ lnw. Then,
at symmetric equilibrium,
Vww + Vw∗w∗ = ψ
Vwww2 + Vw∗w∗(w∗)2 + 2Vww∗ww∗ = −ψ
and consequently, (A.12) can be rewritten as
β
τ
− β(n− 1)
σ2
− 1
n
ψ = 0 (A.13)
It just remains to solve for ψ. Note also at symmetric equilibrium that σ2w = σ2w∗ = ξ =
σ2
n . Using all these facts, the Bellman equation (A.6) reduces to
ρ (A+ ψ lnw) = {(1 + β) lnw + β ln τ + ψ [1− τ − ρ]− 1
2n
σ2ψ (A.14)
So, by inspection, ψ = (1 + β)/ρ. So, from (A.13) and ψ = (1 + β)/ρ, we obtain the
expression for τn in Proposition 1. ¤
Derivation of the FOC (4.10). At a symmetric equilibrium, w = w∗. So, the
Bellman is
ρV (w,w∗) = max
τ
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
lnw + Vw[[(1− s)r(τ) + sr(τ ∗)− ρ]w + θ(τ)k]
+Vw∗[[(1− s∗)r(τ ∗) + s∗r(τ)− ρ]w∗dt+ θ(τ ∗)k∗]
+Vwww
2
2
σ2w +
Vw∗w∗(w∗)2
2
σ2w∗ + Vww∗ww∗ξ
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
σ2w = [(1− s)2τ2(1−α) + s2(τ ∗)2(1−α)]σ2
σ2w∗ = [(1− s∗)2(τ ∗)2(1−α) + (s∗)2τ 2(1−α)]σ2
ξ = [(1− s)s∗τ 2(1−α) + s(1− s∗)(τ ∗)2(1−α)]σ2
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Evaluate at τ = τ ∗, the Bellman equation is
Vw[0.5r0w + θ0k + θkτ ] + Vw∗ [0.5r0w∗ + θk∗τ ]
+
µ
Vwww2
2
+
Vw∗w∗(w∗)2
2
+ Vww∗ww∗
¶
σ2(1− α)τ 1−2α
2
= 0,
where we already used the fact that
∂σ2w
∂τ
=
∂σ2w∗
∂τ
=
∂ξ
∂τ
=
σ2(1− α)τ 1−2α
2
.
Now, guess V (w,w∗) = A+B lnw, i.e. the value function is independent of w∗. Then,
Vww = B, Vw∗ = 0µ
Vwww2
2
+
Vw∗w∗(w∗)2
2
+ Vww∗ww∗
¶
= −B
2
.
Thus, the FOC becomes, cancelling B and using k = w in symmetric equilibrium:
0.5r0 + θ0 + θ
kτ
k
− σ
2(1− α)τ 1−2α
4
= 0.
This completes the proof. ¤
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